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Epistemology of the Neurodynamics of Mind 
(Commentary on Marks-Tarlow’s “A Fractal Epistemology for Transpersonal Psychology”)
Frederick David Abraham 
Neurodynamics may shed light on under-standing the relationship between subjective experience and scientific explorations of mind 
and behavior. Marks-Tarlow (2020) raises this as an issue 
in the history of transpersonal psychology. I focus on 
this issue in the tradition of Freeman’s neurodynamics 
and related cognitive neuroscience rather than the 
transcendental aspects of transpersonal psychology. 
This involves some basic concepts of dynamical 
systems. It also involves electrophysiology and neuro-
imaging. It also raises some philosophical issues.
A basic premise of this article is that pheno-
menological / experiential and objective / empirical 
approaches inform each other while informing our 
concepts of reality, mind, and transpersonal trans-
actions. I believe that some nuances of science could 
contribute to the progress of transpersonal methods, 
but need not be working tools of transpersonal practice. 
But I do this in the hopes that some appreciation of 
those aspects can be enjoyable even if one is not 
particularly interested in too many of their details, and 
to that end, I try to minimize the technical allusions and 
give transparent characterizations of them. It is for the 
curious, and maybe motivate further inquiry. I think this 
view is syntonic with Marks-Tarlow’s desire to explain 
fractals as relevant to the transpersonal mission.
I have long been an admirer of the writing 
of Terry Marks-Tarlow (since 1991 by personal 
contact and from some of her publications, such as 
2008) as we share a fascination of the confluence 
of dynamical flavors of mathematics, semiotics, and 
the mind, and thus I welcome with pleasure, the 
invitation to comment on these matters. 
Epistemology and Ontology— 
A Yin/Yang Entanglement
Epistemology and ontology are inseparable, two perspectives on the same process. You cannot 
have one without the other. You can’t fabricate 
knowledge about reality (ok, maybe there is no 
such thing) unless you have some concept or 
commitment to the nature of reality, and your 
concepts about the nature of reality are under 
constant revision as you continue to investigate it. 
There is an ongoing dialogue between them, thus 
they are parts of an organic, holistic, process, no 
longer to be considered as parts. This is especially 
true when one is concerned with the mind, because 
the organ of knowing is the object of investigation. 
Which is why Smith “Smitty” Stevens referred to 
psychology as the “propaedeutic science” (Stevens, 
1936). Terry (this issue – and all future citations refer 
to her paper in this issue) states that “transpersonal 
psychology aimed to transcend limitations of 
research and methods [currently] available.” For 
transpersonal psychology, transcendence is not only 
related to going beyond the limitations of current 
research methods, but also to the achieving of “peak 
experiences”, and to Maslow’s “fourth force in 
psychology” which goes beyond self-actualization 
and includes mystical, ecstatic, and spiritual states 
of mind (Maslow, 1988). So, there is an ontology of 
mind that is entangled with its epistemology, which 
confronts the gap between objective and subjective 
ways of knowing. How do we resolve the problem 
of reconciling the scientific modes of investigating 
mind from subjective ways of knowing? 
Some of the proto-transcendental issues have 
engaged earlier psychologists, from various positions, 
such as James (pragmatism and pure empiricismi.e., 
pure experience; James, 1907; Perry, 1954) and 
Jung (analytic psychology; Jung, 1969), which, by 
the way, brings in discussions on the philosophy 
of science, including the analytic philosophies of 
logical positivism and operationalism. It has been 
said that analytic philosophy brought about the 
seeds of its own destruction (Rajchman, 1985; Rorty, 
1982, p. 227), and I think that pursuit of any extreme 
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position does the same: to take a purely subjective 
route to knowledge about the mind cannot escape 
discovering that by itself, it cannot be trusted, it needs 
some additional evidence. And contrary-wise, to 
take a purely operational view forces one to concede 
that much is lost in ignoring the uniqueness of 
personal knowledge. Bridgman himself went through 
a remarkable and passionate evolution following 
his original pronouncements of operationalism 
(Bridgman, 1936). He was concerned with the whole 
scientific process including the life and personality 
of the scientist, the experience of the scientist, to 
which operational procedures, that is, research, were 
but a part. But even these were subject to solipsism 
involved in the observational events. I would contend 
though, that with proper controls and experimental 
replication, the uniqueness of the observation can 
be factored out. However, uniqueness remains 
concerning experimental contexts, and the choice of 
experimental subject matters and procedures, and in 
the interpretation of the results. 
James and Jung both brought in transcendental 
features to their mental ontology, James through his 
radical empiricism (James, 2007; Perry, 1954), and 
Jung via the transgenerational and synchronistic 
aspects of the collective unconscious and 
archetypes. But both promoted a reconciliation 
between the subjective and objective, a wedding 
of the two. In discussing how the anima brings 
material from the unconsciousness to images in 
consciousness, he states, “For me, reality meant 
scientific comprehension. I had to draw concrete 
conclusions from the insights the unconscious had 
given me.” (Jung, 1989, p. 188). 
This statement is an anathema to the general 
principals of scientific investigation that evolved 
from the positivist approach, which rested upon 
reliabilityreplications that are consistentand 
validitymeasurements that represent variables 
which first, can be defined, second can be translated 
into experimental procedures, and third are either of 
intrinsic interest or closely related to the aspects of 
reality that you wish them to reveal. Furthermore, 
they should exhibit lawful relationships among 
themselves, and if you are lucky, they generalize to 
many more situations than those from which they are 
initially derived. These features obviate, by definition, 
the uniqueness of the contextual issues, including 
the hope, fears, and insights of the investigator. 
Heraclitus’s not stepping in the same stream twice 
holds for James’ “stream of consciousness”. Of 
course, Jung’s observations of his own mind do not 
meet some of Steven’s criteria for being science. But 
in other ways, they do meet some of the scientific 
criteria (Jung, 1989). One of Stevens properties of 
operational psychology reads “What becomes 
acceptable psychology accrues only when all 
observations, including those which a psychologist 
makes upon himself, are treated as though made on 
‘the other one.’” (Stevens, 1939, p. 230). Of course, 
this is what Jung was claiming that his probing his 
own mind was doing. In the 20th century, academic 
psychology tended to despair introspection as it 
allowed personal biases to unconsciously infect 
both data and interpretation, which is evident in 
Jung’s description of his personal experiences, 
despite which he evolved from them some of the 
most popular ideas in analytic psychology, which 
still command professional and lay respect. When 
Loren Riggs attached mirrors on his cornea and 
discovered that stabilized retinal images faded and 
disappeared, that finding seemed more in line with 
Stevens requirement for the objectivity of experience 
as “the other one” (Riggs et al., 1953). 
It has been suggested that collections 
of many brain cells must be involved and that 
networks within and between them, as in Hebbian 
“cell assemblies” (see Abraham, 2011, p. 25) stand 
at the core of integrative brain activity in cognition. 
Freeman’s use of Lashley’s “mass action”, and “cell-
assembly”- are central to his theories and his attack 
on single-neuron doctrines. Difficulties in cognitive 
neuroscience pose serious challenges to reliability 
and validity.
Aesthetics, Conflict Theory, and Fractals
Wundt (1874) developed a conflict theory of aesthetics in which differential strengths of 
aversive and attractive response curves led to an 
inverted-U ( hereafter) arousal function toward 
artistic images. The -function simply describes 
some dependent variable that reaches a maximum 
between the lowest and highest values of another, 
independent variable. In Wundt’s case, aesthetic 
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enjoyment reaches it maximum between the lowest 
and highest values of some aspects of the images 
being viewed, in which case competing aversive 
and attractive hedonic aspects (intervening variables) 
mediate the  relationship. This  is ubiquitous not 
only in many psychological functions, but in nature as 
well—for example, crop yield as a function of rainfall.
Conflict theory was further developed by a 
behavioral, physiological psychologist, Neal Miller 
(1959), in the 1930’s. He was studying rats in mazes 
in an attempt to provide a behavioral model for a 
phenomenological personality feature, namely 
Freud’s “reaction formation”. He did this with a 
learning paradigm where thirsty rats learned that 
both shock and water lay ahead at the end of the 
maze. The conflict of aversive and positive gradients 
left the rats immobile before reaching the ends of 
the maze, showing some instability, often oscillating 
near that point of immobility at first. Again, the 
. Berlyne (1971) made a career of studying such 
phenomena (and also of studying curiosity), and one 
feature he studied was the complexity of the stimuli 
used to simulate aesthetic images. He invoked 
Wundt in explaining his  findings. Others got 
similar results, and several mathematical theories 
were developed to explain them, but the stimuli used 
in these experiments were quite crude. Subsequent 
studies have use more aesthetic images and more 
sophisticated mathematical theories (Abraham et al., 
2011; Aks & Sprott, 1996; Draves, Abraham, Viotti, 
& Abraham, 2008; Mitina & Abraham, 2003).
These new studies used “chaotic” or “strange” 
attractors as stimulimathematicallygenerated 
images which enabled two things pertinent to the thesis 
of objective analysis of experience. The first is that they 
provide an objective metric, the fractal dimension, of 
the complexity of the images, the independent variable. 
Secondly, they provided a more authentic aesthetic 
experience, the measurement of which constituted 
the dependent variable. This combination, we feel, 
provides a more adequate science of experience; a 
more convincing validation of the  relationship of 
aesthetic experience to complexity.
When several factors interact, whether 
measures of some real process, or constructs in 
mathematical models, their behavior follows a path 
that evolves over time, such that they tend to form 
complex patterns (“attractors”) of varying degrees 
of complexity. Some forces tend to make the path 
converge to the attractor, while other tend to force it 
do diverge from it. For Wundt, Berlyne, and our work, 
these forces appear to be the opposing, conflicting 
forces of pleasantness and unpleaseantness of the 
images, arising from their complexity (and likely 
other factors). The aesthetic experience is optimum 
when these forces of convergence and divergence 
within an attractor-space are properly balanced 
for a given individual. The fractal dimension, in 
other words represents that ratio which produces 
the most enjoyable approach to the perceptual 
attractor, and typically is within a midrange of fractal 
dimensionality. Mitina discusses related personality 
traits (Mitina & Abraham, 2003).
Our studies (Abraham et al., 2011; Mitina & 
Abraham, 2003) contained another feature differing 
from others’ studies, in that we asked the subjects 
to rate the complexity of the images, which not too 
surprising gave nearly identical  functions. Thus, 
aesthetic and complexity judgements are linearly 
correlated, which raises the question of which is 
primary, the complexity of the percept or the act of 
appraisal of the aesthetic? The question of primacy of 
various factors is at the foundation of much cognitive 
neuroscience, which suggests a holistic interpretation 
is most evident in the “Action-Perception Cycle” of 
Freeman (2000, 2007) and the “Perception-Action 
Cycle” of Fuster (2004, 2017).
Neurodynamics of Phenomenology
While Galen may have been the first to suggest the brain as the locus of the mind, Wundt may 
have been among the first to attempt to measure the 
extent of the brain’s influence on decision-making 
behavior. He used reaction-time measurements and 
imputed brain-mind operations in research using 
mathematical evaluation of differences in the reaction-
times attributable to different cognitive components 
of various tasks—for example, the time for a choice 
reaction minus the latency for a simple reaction could 
yield the time the brain uses to distinguish which of 
two lights turned on. Modern cognitive neuroscientist 
are pretty much still at it, but with much more 
sophisticated experimental and mathematical tools. 
They use various measurements of brain activity, 
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mostly electrophysiological and neuroimaging. I will 
take the iconic program of Freeman as an example 
(Freeman & Skarda, 1985; Skarda & Freeman, 1987; 
Freeman, 2000, 2007; see also Abraham, 2017, 2020; 
Liljenström, 2018). His program is predicated on a 
few basic viewpoints: (1) The collective activity of 
nerve cells in a given region (nucleus or area) is more 
important than the activity of any particular cell; (2) 
Within a given region, there is a subset of cells that are 
more likely to be used in a particular mental activity: 
(3) This subset may vary from one instance to another; 
(4) Different (and possibly overlapping) subsets 
may be utilized by different mental functions; (5) 
Interconnection and thus communications within and 
between regions form functional networks, and some 
of their activities can be meaningful and be measured 
from micro-, to meso-, to macroscopic levels, 
spatially and temporally; (6) These communications 
are interactive (centrifugal-centripetal loops); and (7) 
These networks can be considered as self-organizing, 
dynamical systems.
Freeman and his colleagues used a 
quintessential learning situation with odors as stimuli, 
and made EEG measurements on an innovational 
dense 8x8 array of electrodes on the olfactory bulb. 
Initially he was asking the question, is there a spatial 
(topological) mapping that discriminates one odor 
from another, the way auditory maps spatially in the 
brain (tonotopically), vision with a color mapping, 
somatosensory with a homunculus. They noted two 
types of EEG patterns, one in bursts, in synchrony 
with breathing and with a peak within the gamma 
range (above 25 Hz). The other one a messy mix of 
frequencies similar to a normal EEG. They analyzed 
these bursts, and plotted 3D maps of the amplitude 
of various parameters of the EEG over the surface 
of the bulb being recorded, and found that while 
there might have been a hint of coding for the 
different odors, the maps could be quite variable. 
Karl Pribram once mentioned to me (ca. 1990?) that 
this variability was a serious failure in reliability. At 
that time, I agreed as I had already noted that. But, 
as I shall soon show, this variability led Freeman 
to his principal conjectures about the relation of 
phenomenology to brain functioning. 
Freeman noted that these two types of EEG 
patterns often alternated, and that one of them could 
be viewed as a cyclic (periodic attractor) and the other 
messier (chaotic attractor), and thus be suspected of 
involvement in the evolution of thought processes in 
the brain. These would comprise a series of transitions 
(bifurcations), with relatively stability between 
bifurcations and instability near the bifurcations. 
He summarized a sensory, perceptual, motor, and 
cognitive aspects of the system in a schema he called 
the “Action-Perception Cycle,” which he also calls the 
“intentional arc”. Goal oriented intention is involved in 
the interactions, that is, sensation becomes important 
because the person is forming attractor landscapes 
which modulates all aspects of the interactions 
involved (Freeman, 2000, 2007). 
Skarda (2018) emphasizes that it is best to 
think of the process as holistic. Fuster (2017, appendix 
1) proposes a similar “Perception-Action Cycle,” differ-
ing from Freeman’s, according to Kozma (Kozma & 
Noack, 2017), by emphasizing sensation as initiating 
such a sequence, rather than intention doing most of 
the initiation. 
There may be high-dimensional (chaotic) 
attractors going in the Cycle, particularly in the 
cortical-sensory “preafference” loop, which can 
bifurcate to low-dimensional (nearly cyclic), with the 
sudden appearance of an unexpected stimulus. I have 
suggested that sometime one (sensory/perceptual), 
sometimes the other (intentional, coritco-cognitive) 
aspect may be primary in the initiation of the cycle 
(Abraham, 2017). A more contemporary example of 
such bifurcational behavior occurs at the microscopic 
(microelectrode) level in monkey prefrontal cortex 
in studies of working memory (Spaak et al., 2017). 
Freeman’s debt re intentionality to his mentor, Karl 
Pribram (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960)., can be 
seen his definition:
Intentionality  is the circular process of general-
ization/abstraction of input and specification/
concretization of output by which brains achieve 
understanding of their environments through 
the cycle of prediction, action, sensation, per-
ception, and assimilation by learning. (Freeman, 
2007, first sentence)
An overall picture of brain functioning is that 
there are integrative systems of many distributed 
brain areas and events. There may be several 
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different systems active at the same time. Some 
may use shared areas and processes as well as 
unique areas. There may be switching between their 
relative dominance in mental activity; instabilities 
are responsible for these bifurcations to stable 
dominance of one or a few systems (“metastability”; 
see Abraham, 2017; Fingelkurts et al., 2017; Freeman 
& Holmes, 2005; Kelso & Tagnoli, 2017; Liljenström, 
2017; Mannino & Bressler, 2017).
While Freeman felt the qualia of experience 
lay beyond the reach of neuroscientific observation, 
he did feel that investigation of this intentional 
arc would elaborate the neurodynamics of the 
mental activity that supported such qualia. The 
mental activity need not be conscious, in fact 
he suggested that it is mostly unconscious and 
intermittently becomes conscious. I am not fond of 
the term “consciousness." and prefer to use “levels 
of awareness." A picky concern, but this avoids 
the binary implications in some uses of the terms 
“conscious” and “unconscious.” 
So where does the idea of fractal come 
in? Simply in that chaos, which is involved in most 
mental, behavioral, and neural processes, has fractal 
properties. The most frequently used mathematical 
characterizations of the complexity of a chaotic 
attractor is designated as its “fractal dimension” and 
“Lyapunov Sprectrum” (Abraham, 2014; Abraham, 
Abraham & Shaw, 1990; Abraham & Shaw, 2005; 
Marks-Tarlow, 2020 [this issue]). Liljenström has 
shown an -function of “the rate of convergence 
to a stored limit cycle memory state” as a function 
of different levels of noise (I am taking “noise” as 
an equivalant of “complexity”) introduced into 
units [neurons] in a model of the olfactory system 
(Liljenström, fig. 8, p. 61). This could indicate that, 
just as with aesthetics, optimal levels of complexity 
in brain function may facilitate or be indicative of 
optimal evolution of thought and action.
In summary, we might say that studies show 
that brain and mind undergo dynamic metastable 
variability over time which we attribute, not to 
measurement error, but to perturbations of mental 
and neural activity that possess measurable fractal/
chaotic properties. Some, as Freeman (2000, 2007) 
and many of his cabal conjecture, intentionality 
must be a major feature of the stream of mental and 
neural activity. But can we conjure up experimental 
designs that come closer to the confluence of 
the objective means of investigation and the 
phenomenology of mental activity? I offer one 
example of a clever type of experimental design that 
purports to do just that. It involves measurement 
of brain activity in humans while their thinking is 
under intentional control. 
Inner speech (talking to one’s self silently), has 
been studied intensely over the past 20 years or so, 
developing research methods that defy the difficulties 
involved. Much of it has been directed to Vygotsky’s 
(1987) concepts the socialization in children, which 
played an important part in the development of 
thought in children (e.g., Cole & Wertsch, 1996)., 
and vice versa, an interactive process, not unlike 
Freeman’s and Fuster’s cycles discussed previously, 
which are obviously involved in speech development. 
Ferneyhough nicely précises Vygotsky:
Children deliberately repurpose words that 
they have previously used successfully in social 
interactions with other individuals. Instead of 
regulating the behavior of others, they were 
getting the hang of using language to control 
themselves. (Ferneyhough, 2017, p. 77)
Thus, dialogue is a self-organizational system. 
In public speaking, people regulate each other. In 
inner speech and private speech (speaking to oneself 
out loud), one is controlling oneself. This is also like 
Vitello’s highlighting a metaphor similar to one oft 
used by Freeman, “a jazz combo, which does not 
need a conductor” (Vitello, 1917, p. 163).
Experiments led by Ferneyhough’s 
colleague, Alderson-Day (Alderson-Day et al., 2016) 
compared “dialogic inner speech” to “monologic 
inner speech.” Neuroimaging (fMRI) revealed that 
both would activate brain networks involved in 
speech (left frontotemporal language regions), but 
that the dialogic condition involved additional areas 
“associated with a widespread bilateral network 
including left and right superior temporal gyri, 
precuneus, posterior cingulate and left inferior and 
medial frontal gyri” (Anderson-Day et al., 2016, p. 
110). These areas are also associated with switching 
in visual perspective, and socializing. Again, there 
is an analogy and perhaps the implication of 
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support from the macroscopic level of investigation 
(neuroimaging), of the kind of metastable switching 
involved in the findings of the various authors 
mentioned in the Freeman cabal (those mentioned in 
Abraham, 2017), much of it in the mesoscopic level 
of measurement. At any rate, this work shows that 
subtle nuances of mind can bring objective methods 
to bear on mental activity. It especially shows that 
differences in brain activity, even if there is much 
left to elucidate in terms of micro- and mesoscopic 
dynamics, gives credence to conjectured aspects of 
distinguishing nuanced functions of thought. There 
is progress in the neuroscience of the dynamics of 
mind. 
Creativity
A final word about creativity. The brain, mind, and body are entwined holistically (Marks-Tarlow, 
this issue). The stream of this process meanders a 
trajectory varying from more creative processes to 
more focused processes. That is, they vary between 
high-dimensional chaotic processes arising from 
instability and greater aspects of divergent thinking 
and more stable low-dimensional chaotic, nearly 
periodic or static attractive conditions (Abraham, 
1996, 2007; Abraham, Krippner, & Richards, 
2012; Guilford, 1959; Gardner, 1993). These self-
organizational processes are necessarily involved in 
creativity, such as that of improvisation in playing 
jazz, comedy, and speech. They are also evident in 
psychotherapy, transpersonal and otherwise, and 
psychotherapy in turn depends on the brain-mind 
processes we have discussed, which itself represents 
the fractal property of similarity across scale that 
Terry has so well described.
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